Re: Shareability of construct

Jim Legg (
Mon, 2 Mar 1998 13:57:30 +1300

Snipped from J Mancuso's post...

>"The 'weaker'
>argument is that many cognitive or linguistic structures have the form
>they do because they must be shared. The stronger argument is that only
>in the sharing do the forms exist; that is, no individual mentality
>represents the eventual outcome of the communications of thoughts..."
>She [Freyd] goes on, "the shareability theory
>presented here predicts that the term will be less successful if it is
>not classifiable by existing complements [read; construed using existing
>constructs], even if any one person is perfectly capable of
>understanding the term"

In William Calvin's book The Cereberal Code one gets the impression that
thoughts (memes) communicate by Darwinian evolution and could conclude that
there is little value in building gates that represent an individual
mentality and that neither of the foregoing arguments is broad enough to
explain outcomes of communication.

My question remains: "Does the term 'existing complements' cover all the
time domain in which the development of finite differences takes place?"