Re: Constructivism, truth, and lies

R. A. Neimeyer, U of Memphis (neimeyerra@MSUVX1.MEMPHIS.EDU)
Wed, 28 Feb 1996 15:53:05 -0600

Well said, Tim, on several counts. I particularly appreciated your
parallel between a Platonic ontology and a discursive Socratic practice
designed to reveal that reality, as well as the "essential" reality of an
unchanging self. If constructivist ontology contrasts with this Platonic
conception on the first and third of these features, what sort of
discursive practice might be appropriate to the constructivist

In general, I believe that we constructivists have been most articulate in
staking out our epistemology, somewhat less consistent and explicit in
presenting our models of "self," and relatively silent or ambiguous
concerning the implications of both for the pragmatics of therapeutic
discourse between client and counselor. (Obviously, a number of
constructivists have spoken to this, but not typically in ways that
students and interested others find helpful and clarifying.) I'd
especially like to see some collective brainstorming on this topic, weaving
back to the earlier strand about "romanticism" and the points of contact
between constructionism and constructivism.

Robert A. Neimeyer, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
University of Memphis
Memphis, TN 38152
(901) 678-4680
FAX (901) 678-2579