>But would you be comfortable in saying that there is no such thing as
>imput which is not already organized as a construction? This requries
>that we see the environment, the 'outside' of our system of meaning, as
>just as much organized by and beholden to our interpretive anticipations
>as the other way around, that we do not simply match inside with
>outside, but select from our environment
Two related thoughts from me.
First, let me avoid the notion of "inputs" and instead, offer a favourite
metaphor for talking about "events".
There aren't "events out there". There is a phenomenal flow. Each person
takes his or her own pair of perceptual scissors, cuts the flow in two
places, hold up the bit snipped out, and _calls_ that "an event". The act
of snipping is already an act in which meaning is ascribed, construing
occurs.
Second, to pick up on the matter of whether there is anything
>substantive or meaningful in any sense, to be found
>'out there' in the imput as treated separately from its relation to our
>own organization
Meaningful? No. There is personal meaning as a result of the snip, sure.
However, _after_ snipping out a bit of the phenomenal flow, the person is
in a position to negotiate with other people about _the event(s)_.
Whatever they manage to agree on acquires a meaningful "out there"
status, as a current social construction.
Substantive? Oh yes, and even before the snip occurs. That's what I
called the "phenomenal flow" above. Seems to me we have to have something
of the kind in the first place: in itself substantive, but not
meaningful. NB If I remember correctly (my journals are at work and I
have only my EndNote database to hand at present) Chris Stevens, "Realism
and Kelly's Pragmatic Constructivism", _Journal of Constructivist
Psychology_, 11, 4, 283-308, is highly relevant here.
Kind regards,
Devi Jankowicz
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